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COMMENTARY
Eliminate now: seven critical 
actions required to accelerate elimination 
of Plasmodium falciparum malaria in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion
Andrew A. Lover1*, Roly Gosling1, Richard Feachem1 and Jim Tulloch2
Abstract 
The emergence in 2009 of Plasmodium falciparum parasites resistant to the primary therapies currently in use 
(artemisinin-based combination therapy, ACT) in Southeast Asia threatens to set back decades of global progress in 
malaria control and elimination. Progress to date through multiple sets of initiatives and partners to contain or elimi-
nate these parasites has been hampered due to a wide range of organizational, financial, and health systems-level 
challenges. In this commentary, a set of seven specific and concrete actions are proposed to directly address these 
issues and to accelerate P. falciparum elimination within the Greater Mekong Subregion to avert a wider public health 
crisis. These actions are specifically needed to elevate the situation and response mechanisms to those of a true 
emergency; to address systems-level challenges with personnel limitations and stock-outs of key commodities; and to 
restructure the response mechanisms to be well-aligned with the required outcomes. Consideration of these issues is 
especially pressing with planning meetings for renewal of the Regional Artemisinin-resistance Initiative (RAI) frame-
work slated for late 2016 and into 2017, but these suggestions are also relevant for malaria programmes globally.
© 2016 The Author(s). This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, 
and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/
publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
The problem
The emergence in 2009 of Plasmodium falciparum para-
sites resistant to the primary therapies currently in use 
(artemisinin-based combination therapy, ACT) in South-
east Asia threatens to set back decades of global progress 
in malaria control and elimination. With the passing of 
the 3-year anniversary of the unveiling of the WHO 
emergency response to artemisinin resistance (ERAR) 
within the Greater Mekong region (GMS) [1], the time is 
ideal to reflect upon the challenges ahead, and to propose 
a set of critical actions for rapid progress (Table 1).
A comprehensive review of artemisinin-resistance con-
tainment efforts in 2012 stated that the initial response 
to AR was ‘good, but delayed’, and concluded: ‘For effec-
tive regional action convening of meetings and passing of 
resolutions and declarations is not enough. Responsible 
entities need the mandate and resources to follow-up to 
ensure that agreements are implemented.’ [2].
The initial control efforts within the Thai-Cambodia 
border region around the town of Pailin (the epicentre of 
resistance) were not successful, and containment of these 
parasites to border regions of Myanmar, Vietnam, Thai-
land, Lao PDR, Cambodia and China (Yunnan province) 
is unfeasible due to multiple populations of resistant 
parasites. Evidence suggests the parasite mutates under 
intense drug pressure, and this has occurred at multi-
ple sites independently within the GMS [3]; the genetic 
markers of artemisinin resistance (specific Kelch-13 
mutations) have now been identified throughout Myan-
mar [4] and now encroach upon the Indian subcontinent 
(Fig. 1). Finally there is increasing resistance to multiple 
partner drugs, including dihydroartemisinin-piperaquine 
[5, 6].
Consequent to these new challenges, the campaign 
has expanded to one of elimination of all P. falciparum 
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parasites within the region [7]. For P. falciparum elimi-
nation to occur, a credible full scale ‘war’ on the parasite 
has to be undertaken [8]. However, for this campaign to 
be successful, multiple unaddressed challenges need to 
be comprehensively considered, and measures to address 
them rapidly applied to strategic planning.
In any planning to avert a large-scale public health 
crisis, the need for rapid implementation must be bal-
anced against the demand for sustainable health systems 
strengthening. This tension is unavoidable in the cur-
rent emergency response; system-building (inherently a 
gradual and long-term process) must remain a focus, but 
a secondary one in the planning for elimination of P. fal-
ciparum in the region.
Seven critical actions
This commentary does not attempt to design a compre-
hensive framework for malaria elimination; WHO and 
its partners provide that guidance. Instead, it highlights 
seven actions that are critical to accelerating malaria 
elimination efforts. Although it is motivated by the urgent 
need to more effectively address multi-drug resistant 
(MDR) P. falciparum in the GMS, it is hoped that it will 
provoke discussion not only of these issues for the region, 
but also of the requirements for malaria elimination 
globally.
Declare a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC)
The PHEIC mechanism as developed and implemented 
by the WHO allows the organization to formally declare 
that a situation is “an extraordinary public health event 
which is determined to constitute a public health risk to 
other countries through the international spread of dis-
ease; and to potentially require a coordinated interna-
tional response.” [9] Zika virus disease was declared a 
PHEIC in February 2016 on the basis of limited epide-
miological data [10]. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile 
this action with the current situation in the GMS; MDR-
P. falciparum certainly poses an equally grave interna-
tional threat. There is also somewhat of a disconnect 
between the use of the word ‘Emergency’ in the title of 
the ERAR programme, and the outcomes from previous 
WHO-mediated debates on the potential for declaring 
AR a public health emergency, where it was determined 
that the situation did not rise to the level of a PHEIC.
While it must be acknowledged that the actions nec-
essary to address MDR-P. falciparum are inherently dif-
ferent in nature from prior PHEICs (e.g. responses to 
Ebola virus disease), the potential impacts are equally 
dire. While current evidence suggests resistance parasite 
strains are not evolutionarily competitive in sub-Saharan 
Africa [11], it would be prudent to assume that this will 
not remain the case. If or when these parasites spread to 
sub-Saharan Africa, the world can expect major impacts. 
Evolution of resistance to chloroquine is estimated to 
have caused two- to six-fold increases in malaria mortal-
ity and morbidity throughout sub-Saharan Africa [12], 
and modelling suggests the potential for ACT failures 
to cause 10 to 78 million additional malaria cases over a 
4-year period [13].
There should be no doubt that the response to MDR-
P. falciparum needs to be funded, approached, and man-
aged as an emergency. If the current stringent criteria 
necessary to declare a PHEIC are not met by the MDR-
P. falciparum threat, we suggest an alternative categori-
zation should be created to elevate such ‘slow-motion’ 
emergencies to the proper level of global attention: per-
haps a ‘Category II PHEIC’? The elevation of MDR-P. fal-
ciparum to a PHEIC, or creation of an additional PHEIC 
classification to cover situations such as AR, will require 
member states to actively work with WHO in lobbying 
for these changes.
Establish a command‑and‑control structure
The current response to MDR-P. falciparum has been 
hampered by fragmentation and the bureaucratic nature 
of all coordination and oversight. Responsibility is spread 
between multiple WHO offices (Geneva-based Head-
quarters; regional offices for South-East Asia and West-
ern Pacific Regions; and the ERAR Hub in Cambodia), 
each country’s NMCP, plus funding and actions involving 
multiple partners, especially under the Global Fund sup-
ported Regional artemisinin-resistance initiative (RAI). 
Additionally, the multi-stakeholder Regional Steering 
Committee of the $100 million USD RAI has no man-
date or authority to direct or coordinate actions across 
all dimensions of response to MDR-P. falciparum in the 
GMS. This situation is in stark contrast to the end stages 
of smallpox eradication [14], and more recent efforts to 
eliminate polio or tackle SARS [15]. In all of these pro-
grammes, there has been a single unified structure under 
WHO coordination, with clear lines of responsibility and 
accountability.
Table 1 Critical actions for  rapid elimination of  Plasmo-
dium falciparum in the Greater Mekong Subregion
Declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)
Establish a command-and-control structure
Eliminate stock-outs of ACT medicines and RDTs at peripheral sites
Consider realistic time-limited incentives for elimination fieldwork
Provide dedicated leadership support to national malaria programmes
Massively strengthen face-to-face support to peripheral levels
Track operational progress via indicators that capture essential field  
activities
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To achieve the levels of coordinated action required 
to confront MDR-P. falciparum, there should be a single 
regional coordinator, elected and empowered by a multi-
stakeholder governing body that includes representation 
of the GMS NMCP directors, with a broad managerial 
and financial mandate. Responsible and accountable focal 
points must then be identified at country and provin-
cial levels. The overall role and mandate of this structure 
should be clearly defined, and fully supported by existing 
regional structures, including WHO and the Asia–Pacific 
Leaders Malaria Alliance (APLMA) and the Asia–Pacific 
malaria elimination network (APMEN), but there must 
be a single locus of coordination for a well-organized, 
flexible and comprehensive response. The necessity for 
such an approach in eliminating (then “eradicating”) 
malaria in the GMS was specifically highlighted as early 
as 1959:
“Men, money and materials must be welded into an 
organization that has the resources to achieve its 
objects and is flexible enough to meet the unforeseen 
difficulties that must be expected in any biological 
struggle” [16] (emphasis added).
Creating a new and parallel body would only compli-
cate the regional landscape further, and an organization 
built around existing technical and managerial capacity 
in the region, significantly strengthened by secondments 
from appropriate institutions, that would supersede the 
current mechanisms is envisioned. This would require 
all partners to defer authority to the designated regional 
Fig. 1 Geographic spread of reported artemisinin resistance in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS); reporting dates 2011 (a); 2014 (b); and 2015 
(c). (Adapted from WHO updates [35])
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coordinator, which will require a combination of diplo-
macy and selflessness. However, the potential impacts 
of MDR-P. falciparum are such that the governance and 
structure of the response demand creativity and true col-
laboration unimpeded by “turf battles.”
Finally, the critical impact of a charismatic and driven 
leader to advocate, ‘push’ and motivate (as DA Hen-
derson was in the smallpox eradication campaign) was 
highlighted decades ago: “Apart from having technical 
knowledge, [the eradication programme director] should 
be a malariologist of great experience and administrative 
ability, and a man [sic] of character and a leader” [17]. 
The response to MDR-P. falciparum will require a torch-
bearer to advocate at the highest levels; and the role of 
diplomat and mediator should also not be discounted, 
especially in light of the highly complex regional politics.
Eliminate stockouts of RDTs and ACT medicines
Despite improvements in commodity supply with the 
ERAR, the response to MDR-P. falciparum has been 
hampered by stock-outs of critical point-of-care diag-
nostics and drugs [18]. RDTs and ACT medicines must 
be continuously stocked at all district and village-level 
facilities in malarious areas, even during the rainy sea-
son with all the logistical challenges that this entails. 
This deceptively simple activity is the bedrock of effec-
tive case management, and the impact of motivated 
and incentivized village-level malaria workers has 
been clearly demonstrated in multiple countries in the 
region [19, 20]; however, these highly effective workers 
can only have impact when adequate supplies are avail-
able [21]. Most national malaria control programmes 
(NMCPs) in the region have limitations in stock-level 
tracking and management, and so organizations with 
specialists in supply chain management should be sup-
ported to form a consortium of partners with key exper-
tise and incentivized to directly assist with logistics 
and commodity distribution wherever needed, towards 
achieving “zero stock-outs.”
Consider realistic time‑limited incentives 
for elimination field work
Malaria elimination requires that health workers (both 
public sector and non-government) are willing and 
empowered to go beyond their routine activities. This 
requires efforts to go the extra distance to find and inves-
tigate cases, apply additional rigour in interventions, and 
to report with complete accuracy. They need to want to 
eliminate malaria; achieving this is in part a question of 
incentives, both monetary and otherwise. The economic 
realities of staff on the ground need to be realistically 
considered, especially in light of the modest salaries for 
many government health staff, some of whom are obliged 
to have other sources of income to provide a reasonable 
standard of living.
The considerable funding flowing into the region for 
malaria (projected to be ~$150 million USD in 2016) has 
potentially distorted the incentive system in a manner 
that is unsustainable in the long run, and there are clear 
reasons why donors are unwilling to subsidize govern-
ment sector salaries. However this should be balanced by 
evidence that incentives, whether salary top-ups or sim-
ply covering out-of-pocket expenses for fieldwork, have 
produced results [22, 23]; and withdrawing them at a 
time when malaria elimination requires a surge of activity 
will almost certainly not galvanize action.
Addressing this dilemma may require innovative solu-
tions, potentially including subsidizing the formation 
of truly integrated vector-borne disease programmes 
that nevertheless maintain malaria-specific capabilities; 
or creation of scholarship programmes for more junior 
staff working on malaria elimination. Direct payment of 
bonuses to teams of workers for producing well-defined 
and measurable results should also not be ruled out; and 
payment could even take the form of contributions to 
staff pension schemes. Implementation of these incentive 
programmes will require close collaborations between 
Ministries of Health, Finance, and Planning in each of 
the GMS countries, which should be started as rapidly as 
possible.
Elimination programmes have been specifically high-
lighted as an important opportunity to stimulate and 
energize health sector staff towards overall health sys-
tems strengthening [24, 25], and this should be fully 
harnessed. Secondly, local solutions need to be urgently 
developed that incentivize NMCPs at all levels to make 
the extra efforts required knowing this will likely transi-
tion their jobs, and even their programmes, out of exist-
ence [26]. Acknowledgement and transparent planning 
around this transition is critical to support staff morale, 
and rapid progress.
Provide dedicated support to NMCP leaders 
in countries
There is pressing need for direct leadership support 
within the NMPCs. The limited number of experienced 
malariologists in NMCP offices face a difficult dilemma: 
they must remain fully engaged in high-level national and 
regional dialogues, but also be available for the leadership 
and management of practical day-to-day malaria activi-
ties. It is often that latter that suffers, hampering regional 
progress. One potential avenue to address this issue is 
externally funded support for programme and techni-
cal management. This could, for example, consist of two 
full-time support positions within each GMS country- 
one dedicated to policy and technical issues, the other 
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for finances and on-the-ground project management, but 
needs would vary in each programme. The sole responsi-
bility of these positions would be to support the national 
and provincial level NMCP management on practical 
aspects of malaria elimination- the size and scope of 
necessary response to MDR-P. falciparum is such that 
NMCPs leaders need far greater support.
Massively strengthen face‑to‑face support 
to peripheral levels
The variability in motivation and engagement of health 
facility and village-level malaria staff has been highlighted 
as a major concern [2, 27]. While tangible incentives are 
important in this regard, so too is knowing that higher 
levels in the organizational structure are engaged in, and 
fully support, field workers’ efforts. This requires creation 
of a well-oiled ‘machine’ to organize, supply, support and 
supervise operations of these staff, and this is as equally 
important for the critical village level workers (whether 
paid or otherwise) as it is for other health staff.
Deployment of technical elimination teams who spend 
their time in the field at district and provincial sites would 
address this gap; indeed, this structure was mandated in 
the global malaria eradication campaign (GMEP) in India 
[28]. Malaria will not be eliminated from offices in capi-
tal cities, or without the direct involvement and support 
of in-country staff. Currently, NMCPs do not have ready 
access to adequate and flexible funding to support regular 
fieldwork, and too many administrative responsibilities 
to get out of their offices-supportive supervision cannot 
be a special activity to be carried out only infrequently.
It is proposed that these field support staff would be 
full-time positions supporting sub-national managers, 
conducting problem-solving with fixed field staff, moni-
toring programme implementation, and providing direct 
and constant feedback to the NMCP. Support of this 
nature was specifically highlighted as a contributing fac-
tor to smallpox eradication:
“The quality and nature of supervision were of vital 
importance. The best results were obtained where 
WHO, national, and state or provincial supervi-
sory staff travelled frequently into the field to review 
activities and to work with field staff in resolving 
problems” [29].
The smallpox eradication programme used a combina-
tion of international staff and national staff redeployed 
from their usual duties for several months to fill these 
supervision roles under WHO coordination; this model 
could be followed for malaria elimination. Partner organ-
izations already working on malaria elimination could be 
asked to provide field staff to help manage programme 
logistics and supportive supervisions to ‘free-up’ NMCP 
staff to focus on targeted elimination activities. Addition-
ally, a cadre of highly motivated and energetic field staff 
could be recruited through donor-country volunteer 
programmes, international and national NGOs, and the 
private sector to work alongside redeployed government 
staff for field-based support.
A second facet of this issue is a need for detailed con-
sideration of the true scale of the necessary response; two 
illustrative comparisons suggest that a considerable scale-
up of human resources for malaria elimination is needed. 
In the 1930’s the Rockefeller Foundation-led elimination 
of Anopheles gambiae (arabiensis) from Brazil required 
4000 field staff working full-time over 22 months to elimi-
nate the vector from around 45,000 km2 [30]; and during 
the GMEP, India had programme units covering about 1 
million population, each of which had four trucks, two 
jeeps, and two pickups, and 250 total staff [31]. While 
population-level indoor residual spraying of all households 
is a different type of programme from current elimina-
tion activities, these numbers highlight the sheer magni-
tude of effective programmes, and if activities like weekly 
fever surveys, or mass drug administration are needed, 
then comparable levels of staffing and transport must be 
considered.
Track operational progress via indicators 
that capture essential field activities
The major metrics for regional malaria elimination focus 
on indicators like morbidity, mortality, and bed-net cov-
erage (e.g., Appendix 3 in [1]). However, additional met-
rics need to be aligned with Leonard Bruce-Chwatt’s 
view of malariology as a field of ‘blood, mud and sweat’ 
[32]. The critical and largely ignored gap is one of track-
ing the activities of muddy boots on the ground, and in 
end-of-the road clinics, villages and informal settlements. 
Malaria elimination requires intensive effort at the far-
thest periphery of the health sector, and well beyond. 
Comprehensive malariometric indicators and measure-
ment of interventional coverage is certainly the ideal, but 
may not be realistic at the furthest periphery in often dif-
ficult conditions [33]. These “bottom-line” measures will 
not be achieved without good management of actions 
extending to the most remote cases. Knowing if and how 
these actions are taking place is possible and moreo-
ver, critical to success, as specifically emphasized in the 
1940’s during Brazil’s Yellow Fever programme:
“Even after it was apparent that A. aegypti could be 
eradicated from any given area with the technique 
described, final results were often disappointingly 
slow and it was found that success in species elimi-
nation was to be achieved only on the basis of care-
ful organization and meticulous supervision” [34].
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Conclusions
This commentary makes the case that malaria elimination, 
and more specifically the elimination of MDR-P. falciparum 
in the GMS, will not be achieved without investments that 
go beyond those needed to maintain routine NMCP activi-
ties. All successful disease elimination programmes to date 
have involved very significant support to organize, support 
and oversee effective field operations. There is every reason 
to assume malaria elimination will be no different.
With respect to MDR-P. falciparum in the GMS time 
is short, and rapid consideration of major policy changes 
is critical. It is imperative that the next wave of invest-
ment is applied with utmost attention to effectiveness 
and efficiency; this implies strategic changes and apply-
ing lessons from successful historical programmes. The 
anticipated funding by the Global Fund of the all-impor-
tant RAI being discussed now and into early 2017, as well 
as potential new investments from other donors, pro-
vides a critical opportunity to honestly assess what will 
be required to accelerate elimination of multi-drug resist-
ant P. falciparum and to invest resources accordingly. 
Failure to do so will put in question not only the outcome 
of that effort, but also the seriousness of the global health 
community’s commitment to malaria elimination.
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